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NATGAS
A Model of the European Natural Gas Market1
The NATural GAS model is an integrated model of the European wholesale gas market providing
long-run projections of supply, transport, storage and consumption patterns in the model region,
aggregated in 5-year periods, distinguishing two seasons (winter and summer). Model results
include levels of investment in the various branches, output and consumption, depletion of
reserves and price levels. The NATGAS model computes long-term effects of policy measures
on future gas production and gas prices in Europe. NATGAS is an equilibrium model describing
behaviour of gas producers, investors in infrastructure (pipeline, LNG capacity, as well as
storage), traders and consumers. NATGAS covers the main European demand regions, including
the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. Moreover, it covers the main origins
of supply on the European market, such as Russia, Norway, Algeria, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and LNG. In this memorandum, we ﬁrst discuss the theoretical background as well as
the model speciﬁcations. Afterwards, we describe the data we used, present some results and
assess validity by computing sensitivities and comparing with current developments.
1 This memorandum is written as part of the project on Dutch gas-depletion policies (see Mulder and Zwart (2006a)). The
authors of this memorandum beneﬁted from discussions with representatives of the gas industry, TNO-NITG and
government as well as a number of external and internal colleagues, in particular Rob Aalbers (SEO) and Cees Withagen
(UvT) and seminar participants at the 2005 IAEE Conference in Bergen. We also beneﬁted from earlier work on gas
modelling at CPB by Jeroen de Joode and Mark Lijesen. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.1 Introduction
The European natural gas market is undergoing profound changes as a result of a number of
factors. Since the late 1990s, the market has been moving towards an organisational structure
relying on the principle of competition between market participants. This change of the market
system coincides with technological developments, not only driving down costs of production
and exploration, but also opening the way to economic long distance transport of gas in liqueﬁed
form, so that more remote production centres gain importance. Another major development
affecting the European gas market is the gradual depletion of gas resources in Europe itself,
which will necessarily force European countries to adjust focus to new sources of gas outside the
EU.
These developments create a shift of paradigm in the European gas markets that will take
place during the coming decades. In the light of these changes, it is of importance to reconsider
policies that were adopted in the pre-liberalisation gas era, in order to test them for robustness
under the new market circumstances. One of the approaches to aid such policy analysis is to
develop a computable equilibrium model, based on theoretical concepts and gas market data,
giving a framework of analysis that allows to consistently keep track of the available data and its
interrelations. Such a model may be used to gain insight into the implications of policy decisions
on behaviour of economically rational market agents.
Our objective is to develop a model of the long-term European gas market, NATGAS,
describing investments and production decisions as well as consumption and transport patterns
of gas. As a basis for describing the competitive interactions among market players we will start
from a game theoretic approach, describing gas actors as proﬁt maximising entities. The
interaction of these market players leads to an equilibrium, the characteristics of which can be
studied under various policy scenarios.
In this note we will ﬁrst present some background information on essential features of the
European gas market. Then we discuss the modelling approach to this market, which is in part
based on received theory on electricity markets, and in addition incorporates ideas from resource
economics. Next, we describe the NATGAS model in terms of objective functions (and
constraints) for the individual market participants. We then discuss the input data of the model,
and make an assessment of the models result by comparing with projections from other sources.
Finally we explore some policy questions that may be addressed using the model.
12 European gas markets
A model of the gas market is a description of the real market, capturing its fundamental features.
To construct an empirically well founded model, it is necessary to consider the essential
characteristics of the European gas market. In this section we discuss these characteristics. We
ﬁrst focus on gas production, ﬁniteness of resources and the expected developments in the
demand-supply balance in Europe. We then discuss the seasonal characteristics of the market
and the associated role of ﬂexibility, and we conclude by outlining the developments in
competitive restructuring of the market initiated by the EU.
2.1 Gas supplies and demand
One of the core characteristics of the gas market is the ﬁniteness of resources. As countries
endowed with natural gas resources explore these assets and bring them to production, the stock
of gas declines. As a result after some period indigenous supplies are bound to dry up and
external gas supplies are needed to meet domestic demand. As a consequence of this feature, gas
supply-demand balances are subject to signiﬁcant changes over longer time periods. For the
Western European market, such changes now appear to be imminent. We here ﬁrst brieﬂy
describe the historic evolution of gas supplies to Europe, then comment on the current prospects
for indigenous European gas supplies and future reliance on more remote and new sources of
gas.
The European natural gas market started its development in the 1960s, after the discovery of
the giant Groningen gas ﬁeld in the Netherlands. Importance of natural gas increased after the
1973 oil crisis, as Europe strived to decrease its dependence on the Middle East oil producing
countries. This process was encouraged by the new gas ﬁnds in the North Sea, in the British,
Norwegian, Dutch and Danish sectors of the continental shelf. Expansion of transport pipeline
capacity towards, mainly, Russia and Algeria made these countries with their huge gas reserves
into prominent suppliers of the European markets.1
Currently Russia has turned into leading gas supplier to Europe, with a market share of some
25% of a total European demand of around 500 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas2 in 2001,
closely followed by the UK. The Netherlands provide about 15% of European gas, while
Norway is fourth. Algeria’s exports to Europe are still restricted by cross-Mediterranean pipeline
capacity of some 32 bcm per year.
1 see e.g. Seeliger (2004) for an overview of historic developments
2 or over 5000 TWh of energy
2Remaining gas stocks of in particular the UK, and to a slightly lesser extent the Netherlands,
are declining, however. Table 2.1 gives some key ﬁgures on remaining resources in the various
regions. Reserves are the part of total resources that have been discovered and are recoverable
and commercial. Reserves decline as gas is produced, but new reserves can be added by
exploration and discovery of new ﬁelds, or by changes in technological or economic
circumstances. Total remaining resources also include potential additional reserves (discovered
but not technically or commercially producible) or undiscovered resources3. Clearly numbers
for non-discovered resources are to some extent speculative, based on general geological data on
the region, and we here use midpoint estimates of ranges typically reported. Reserve to
production ratios are obtained by dividing current reserves by current annual production.
Table 2.1 Reserves and reserve-to-production ratios for selected countriesa
Proven reserves in bcmb remaining resources Reserve-to-production ratio (years)
Norway and Denmark 2467 5319 38
United Kingdom 905 1550 8
The Netherlands 1449 1815 20
Algeria 4500 5636 53
Russia 32960 77696 46
Iran 26000 >100
Qatar 14400 >100
a based on national government data, IEA and Seeliger (2004)
b billion cubic metres
Observing table 2.1 one ﬁnds that on a medium- to long-term time scale, the supply situation
in Europe is to change drastically, as the resources in the UK and the Netherlands will be
reaching exhaustion within the coming decades. On the demand side, on the other hand,
European gas consumption is expected to keep on growing. The major driving factor of this
growth is the expected increase in the share of gas-ﬁred electricity plants in power production
(see e.g. IEA (2005b)), of course depending on realised prices for gas. This divergence between
supply and demand projections calls for additional sourcing of gas from outside the EU.
Currently, the gas market is still a regional market, as transport is dominated by gas ﬂows
through pipelines. Increasingly however, shipping of gas in liquid form (LNG) gains importance,
as costs of gas liquefaction and LNG transport are falling. Although at present only a small
fraction of global gas trade is in LNG, its importance will grow as supplies will become
dependent on the huge gas reserves in areas more remote from the main consumption regions.
As shipping of gas offers much greater ﬂexibility than pipeline transport, one may expect an
3 see e.g. DTI (2005) for terminology
3increasingly global market for gas.
Future supplies to Europe will therefore rely not only on expansion of exports from existing
(pipeline) suppliers (Norway, Russia, Algeria), but also on new imports from other countries,
possibly in the form of LNG. Clearly this will involve signiﬁcant investments in production and
pipeline capacity as well as LNG import terminals over the coming decades.
2.2 Flexibility
Demand for gas varies signiﬁcantly over time. For example, use of gas for heating by residential
consumers creates a seasonal pattern, while also on a daily time scale differences in usage during
day and night time can be observed. Part of these demand variations are predictable (e.g. more
gas use in winter), while on top of this average foreseeable pattern, variations occur by
exogenous factors (such as short-term temperature ﬂuctuations). The size of demand ﬂuctuations
differs strongly over sectors (energy-intensive industry typically has a more constant demand for
gas). As distributions of gas consumption over sectors vary considerably between different
countries, swing in gas demand will also differ between countries. IEA (2002) discusses this in
more detail.
To accommodate these patterns in consumption, supply of gas has to be ﬂexible. In principle
various mechanisms of creating ﬂexibility exist.
• Changing output of production (production swing). Gas ﬁelds have different capabilities of
changing output levels. In theory any gas ﬁeld can temporarily be shut down (for example in low
demand summer). It is, however, not always economic to produce far below maximum capacity.
Some gas ﬁelds produce gas only as a by-product of oil (associated or wet gas), implying that
actual output is driven by oil economics. For gas production in more remote areas, where capital
costs of transport are high, capacity will be kept sufﬁciently low to ensure continuous utilisation
in order to recover investment costs. In Europe, a large part of output variation is created by the
onshore Dutch Groningen ﬁeld. Also many ﬁelds on the UK Continental Shelf used to produce
gas with relatively high swing.
• Variable imports. At the country level, a potential source of gas ﬂexibility is imports. This
requires that in low demand periods, import capacity is not fully used. Again, for long distances,
such seasonal overcapacity may be uneconomic.
• Storage. A third option is to store gas produced in low demand periods and release it in high
demand seasons. Storage of gas occurs in depleted gas ﬁelds and underground water reservoirs
(aquifers), in salt caverns, or in liqueﬁed form in LNG storage units. Furthermore the ability to
operate the transport grid at different pressures allows for short term storage in the grid itself,
known as line pack.
4• Load management. Large gas users may be able to react to high gas prices by reducing their gas
demand. This is in particular the case for electricity producers, who at any moment evaluate the
choice whether to produce power by burning gas or to buy power from the electricity market.
• LNG. Import of liqueﬁed natural gas does not rely on ﬁxed pipelines. Therefore, shiploads of
LNG can easily be redirected to differing markets depending on price movements. Although the
majority of LNG contracts are still long term, the trade in spot LNG (LNG not traded in long
term contracts) is growing rapidly.
2.3 Markets
The EU initiated the liberalisation of the European gas markets by issuing European Directives
on the internal gas markets in 19984 and 20035. The objective of these measures was to open the
gas markets formerly dominated by state-owned monopolies to competition. Main mechanisms
to achieve successful entry of new market players were the unbundling of these monopolies into
separate transmission system operators and production and trading coapnies, creation of
third-party access to the grids, as well as the gradual opening of end user markets to competition.
The liberalisation process is still in its infancy. Its current success differs over the various EU
member states. The United Kingdom have been among the ﬁrst in the world to liberalise their
gas market, and now enjoy a competitive wholesale market with a liquid short term market place
for wholesale gas contracts. Scarce network access capacity as well as storage capacity are
allocated partly through auction mechanisms.
Elsewhere in Continental Europe, liquid short term markets have only recently started to
develop, mainly in Belgium and the Netherlands, and to some extent in Italy. The Zeebrugge hub
in Belgium derives its liquidity mainly from the presence of the interconnector that is used for
daily arbitrage with the UK market. Liquidity on the recently initiated virtual market place in the
Netherlands, called TTF (Title Transfer Facility) is growing fast DTe (2005).
The larger part of continental trade, however, is currently still dominated by long-term
contracts. Most transport capacity, which is allocated on a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve basis, is mainly
used by the former (unbundled) monopolists. The need for markets generating short term price
signals will, however, increase as competition for the newly liberalised end users grows, and
presumably one may expect a development similar to the development in electricity markets.
There, within a few years, spot markets have been created, and a slow change towards
market-based allocation of transmission capacity can be observed. It is precisely the larger
4 EU Directive 98/30/EC
5 EU Directive 2003/55/EC
5players in the electricity market that are among the greatest initiators of market reform in the gas
markets6, as they are in a position to take advantage of the growing value of short-term
ﬂexibility in the gas markets.
In our modelling approach, we assume that the transition to efﬁcient markets will continue.
This means that markets will be accessible for domestic and foreign producers as well as
independent traders alike. Infrastructure capacity, such as pipelines, storage and LNG import
terminals, will either be allocated to independent players by an efﬁcient auctioning procedure, or
will be used competitively by independent owners. In either case (implied) prices for such
capacity will reﬂect marginal usage costs in case of slack capacity, or a scarcity price rationing
demand for these services when capacity is fully used. Investments will be such that a sufﬁcient
degree of shortage remains to make up for investment costs. In the next section we will elaborate
further on modelling the gas market.
3 Modelling gas markets: theoretical considerations
The model we wish to develop supposes a market for gas with imperfect competition between
production companies. In addition, gas transmission companies sell available transport capacity
between regions to producers and traders at a price required for efﬁcient rationing, while
investing to expand capacity in the long term. Finally, independent operators invest in, and use,
storage and LNG import capacity.
A key component of the model should be the intertemporality, that arises from three sources.
The ﬁrst source of intertemporal relationships between decisions is the scarcity value of gas: due
to the ﬁniteness of gas reserves, there is an opportunity cost to extracting gas that is related to
future gas prices. Secondly, on a medium-term time scale, intertemporality arises due to
investment decisions: current investment determines future capacities of production and
transport equipment, and hence inﬂuences future production decisions. Finally, on a short time
scale, intertemporal constraints are generated by the ability of market participants to store gas in
(low-demand) summer, and use it in (high-demand) winter periods. In this section we discuss the
implications of these issues for modelling the gas market, referring to the related literature.
6 The ﬁrst transactions on the newly launched spot gas exchanges in Belgium and the Netherlands were between major
European electricity companies
63.1 Imperfect competition
Competition on the natural gas market is imperfect due to the existence of physical and legal
restrictions on the supply side. To account for this we will describe behaviour of gas producers
in terms of competition in quantities using a conjectural variations approach. According to this
approach, producers optimise their individual proﬁts using production and investment quantities
as decision variables. In doing this they realise the impact their individual production and
investment decisions will have on future prices. In the most stringent limit of zero conjectural
variations, producers assume that in equilibrium, their own strategies do not impact their
competitors’ quantity choices. Increasing conjectured responses towards one gives results closer
to perfectly competitive behaviour. In that case, producers would assume that any withholding of
supplies on their part would be met by comensating supplies by their competitors. They would
therefore operate as price takers.
Quantity competition may be considered a sensible approach to market behaviour in the gas
market, especially in the long run, due to the capital intensiveness of the sector, the importance
of capacity constraints in the market and the relatively high costs of storing gas. Furthermore,
the large entry barriers due to the required licenses for gas exploration, and to some extent, the
indivisibility of gas ﬁelds, reduces the scope for margin erosion due to new entry, and, hence,
leaves the number of players per country relatively small.
The quantity competition assumption has been widely used more in strategic modelling of
energy markets. Golombek et al. (1995, 1998) used a Cournot model of the European gas market
to assess the impact of liberalisation on prices in Europe, while Mathiesen et al. (1987)
compared Cournot, competitive and collusive equilibria in the European market. In Boots et al.
(2004), the impact of traders in a conjectural variations production market is investigated.
Strategic modelling in the electricity sector is much more widespread, and also here the Cournot
model and variations thereof have received much attention. Early examples are Borenstein and
Bushnell (1999) who study the Californian market , and Bergman and Andersson (1995) for the
Swedish market, who both attempted to predict effects of the coming deregulation of electricity
generation in those respective jurisdictions. Much attention has been devoted to modelling the
effects of constraints in transport capacity in electricity markets. Smeers and Wei (1997) and
Hobbs (2001) provide models where scarce transmission capacity, and its efﬁcient rationing, are
incorporated in the Cournot framework.
The basic conjectural variations model assumes that all producers make their quantity
decisions simultaneously. This assumption need not be valid in the gas market for various
reasons. Investment lead times differ widely for various countries. It is often argued that e.g.
investment lead times for Russian production are much longer than those for other countries
7supplying Europe. As a result of this, one may argue that Russia has a ﬁrst-mover advantage, as
it can credibly commit to increase future output, inﬂuencing other producers’ investment
decisions. Competition on the gas market may therefore have Stackelberg characteristics.
A different reason for non-simultaneous producer decisions lies in the widespread
government intervention in national gas markets (see Mulder and Zwart (2006b)). Government
policies can restrict proﬁt optimising behaviour, both on the upside and the downside. As an
example, the Dutch government has implemented a production cap on production from the
Groningen ﬁeld.
We incorporate such characterisitics in the model by allowing for exogenous constraints on
production. Stackelberg behaviour by Russia would then be modelled as a minimum production
constraint. We do not solve for the optimum level (this would lead to large computational
problems), but rather base these levels on projections of actual production.
Equilibrium conditions for such models consist of a set of ﬁrst order conditions,
corresponding with the individual proﬁt maximization of all agents represented by the model
(e.g. producers, consumers, transmission system operators, traders, operators of storage
facilities, etc), subject to a set of constraints (e.g. production does not exceed capacity). As a
simple example to illustrate the mathematical structure of the model equations, consider a single
monopolist (not facing any resource constraints) optimising its proﬁt - revenues minus costs -
under the constraint that its production x is positive, but cannot exceed production capacity C.
Given a price, which depends on supply as P(x), and production costs c(x), the monopolist
solves
max(xP(x)−c(x)) subject to x ≥ 0, x ≤C.
Introducing a dual variable µ for the capacity constraint, the ﬁrst order conditions take the
form





µ ≥ 0, x −C ≤ 0, µ ·(x −C) = 0. (3.1)
Such sets of equations are known as complementarity conditions, and this type of
mathematical problem is known under the name of (mixed) complementarity problem (MCP).
The use and solution of MCPs has been extensively studied, for instance in the context of
electricity models (see, for an overview, Hobbs and Helman (2004)). Large MCPs (containing
thousands of variables) can be solved efﬁciently using the PATH algorithm which we will apply
within the modelling environment GAMS.
83.2 Investment and ﬁnite resources: a dynamic game
A long-run strategic model of the gas market necessarily is a dynamic game, as market players
repeatedly interact in the market. Furthermore, decisions taken in one period affect behaviour in
the next. Current investments in production or transmission assets enable market players to
expand production or trade in future periods. Moreover, in a market such as the gas market,
where resources are ﬁnite, gas currently extracted reduces total resources and therefore limits
future production. Therefore, one needs to devise a model that covers multiple periods, and
allows for temporal interdependencies of decisions.
In general, dynamic games may involve strategies that are functions of the whole history of
the game. Players would, in that case, condition their actions on past observed behaviour of their
competitors. Such information structures are relevant for explaining cartel behaviour, which
involves so-called punishment strategies that cartels employ to prevent their members from
deviating from the coordinated strategy.
Such ‘closed-loop’ strategies typically are hard to compute in realistic examples (and
moreover, do not in general lead to unique equilibria). Furthermore, one might argue that in
actual complex markets, in the long run, players are unlikely to incorporate all historic
information on their competitors’ behaviour in their current decision making. A more common
approach in the literature is to restrict attention to two classes of strategies. The ﬁrst is that of
open-loop games, where strategies are functions only of time: ﬁrms formulate their strategies
once and commit to these. A Nash equilibrium in such a game consists of a set of
(time-dependent) strategies such that no player would wish to choose a different strategy given
the choices of its competitors. One might phrase this as saying that, while the strategies of the
game are dynamic, the game itself is not, as all strategies are chosen and ﬁxed initially.
The second equilibrium type is the feedback equilibrium (or Markov perfect equilibrium),
which extends the strategy space to functions depending both on time and on a set of current
state variables, involving e.g. the current production capacities and resource stocks of itself and
its competitors. This means that, in contrast to the open-loop game, the feedback game is truly
dynamic, and equilibrium in the game is required to be subgame perfect7. Feedback equilibria
allow for consideration of the effects of pre-emptive investment by players, who anticipate that
their current investments will affect the future investment behaviour of their competitors. A
disadvantage of the feedback approach, however, is its numerical intractability for larger models.
Feedback equilibria have been computed analytically in stylised models (such as symmetric
7 This means that equilibrium strategies are deﬁned and optimal even if at some previous point a player might have
deviated from the equilibrium.
9linear quadratic models, see Reynolds (1987)), and numerically in discrete models, see e.g.
Pakes and McGuire (1994). In this discrete setting, computation time grows exponentially in the
number of variables, which prevents solution for more realistic models.
While feedback models may more realistically capture a wider set of strategic behaviour,
their computation is therefore prohibitive in most realistic models. The limited research that has
been done on the differences between the two game forms in investment models indicates that
the outcomes of the two approaches are, in those cases, not drastically different (Reynolds
(1987), Murphy and Smeers (2003)). A general result seems to be that the equilibrium in the
feedback equilibrium would involve slightly larger capacities and lower prices than the
open-loop model (but higher than the perfectly competitive result). This effect can be ascribed to
the desire (or threat) of pre-empting one’s competitor, which leads one to slightly overinvest.
These sources studied feed-back models for general capital intensive markets. The case for
ﬁnite resource markets, such as the natural gas market, may be slightly different as a result of the
intertemporal resource constraints. Withagen et al. (2003) show that in a situation where a
Stackelberg monopolist operates in a market with competitive fringe suppliers, the open-loop
equilibrium is equivalent to the feed-back equilibrium in those situations where the former
exhibits dynamical consistency. This means that along the open-loop equilibrium extraction
paths, players would not wish to change their producion plans if given the opportunity to do so at
a later stage. In our model, the open-loop equilibrium can indeed be shown to be dynamically
consistent.
As mentioned, the two main sources for intertemporality over longer time scales in the
natural gas market derive from the investment in capacity, which relaxes production and
transmission constraints in subsequent time periods, and from the resource constraint, which
limits aggregate production over all time periods. The investment problem in power markets has
been addressed by Denis et al. (2002), Pineau and Murto (2003) and Murphy and Smeers (2003).
These authors all focus on investment in production capacity. We are not aware of extensions to
the transmission market.
We combine the approach to investment with the ﬁniteness of resources. A constraint on the
sum of production quantities, when binding, results in a non-zero shadow price, the so-called
resource rent, in the optimisation of production in each period. This shadow price may be
interpreted as a mark up to the marginal costs of producing, which increases with time at a rate
equal to the discount rate of the problem. There exists an extensive literature on these resource
rents, in particular in the competitive and the monopoly (cartel) case, see e.g. Withagen (1999)
for an overview. An application of intertemporal optimisation under Cournot competition in
energy markets is given in Bushnell (2003), in a complementarity model of electricity markets
including hydropower generation. Hydropower production is constrained by the capacity of the
10water reservoir, which is ﬁlled only gradually (or in some seasons).
4 The NATGAS model
In NATGAS, we model behaviour of gas producers potentialy supplying Europe, gas
consumption in Europe, the actions of transmission operators building and operating
third-party-access pipelines connecting the various regions, investments in storage facilities and
LNG import capacity, and actions of traders arbitraging the various regional and seasonal
markets. We are interested in the long-run behaviour of market participants, on time scales
where the ﬁniteness of the various resources is of importance, as well as in shorter time-scales in
which capacity is effectively ﬁxed. We model time as a sequence of discrete periods, each
consisting of multiple seasons (e.g. summer and winter) to account for periodic variation in
demand. In solving the model we use period steps of multiple years.
4.1 Producers’ behaviour
Producers are characterised by the country (index i) they are located in. We allow for multiple
producers ni within a country, but will treat these as symmetric in the model. (One might set ni
equal to the inverse of the production HHI in each market). An exception is the Dutch system,
where we differentiate between production from the large, low marginal cost Groningen ﬁeld
(producing low-cal gas) and the other ﬁelds (small ﬁelds), mainly located on the Dutch
Continental Shelf. Producers are assumed to optimise the net present value of their operations,
using two strategic variables: production quantities and investments. Production quantities xi,j,s,t
are chosen for each consumption market j, season s and time period t. Investments in capacity,
leading to available capacity Ii,t, are chosen for each period t. These capacities will determine
the bounds on total production in each period, in each country. Each producer maximises his





δt [(Pj −wij)xij −c−K·(Iit −Dit)] (4.1)
over its decision parameters xi,j,s,t, production,and Ii,t, investments. The maximisation is subject
to constraints:
x,I ≥ 0
åjxijt ≤ Ii,t−1 (µ)
Iit −Dit ≥ 0 (λ)
åjt xijt ≤ Ri (σ)
11Producers are assumed to have access to, generally, a large number of ﬁelds in the region i. In
each period a producer may invest capital to develop a number of ﬁelds, leading to an increase in
its total production capacity I. Marginal investment costs are K, and will increase over time. We
treat the possible range of investments as quasi-continuous. Once these investments have been
sunk, the producer has production capacity at its disposal to use for production x, at variable
costs c, generally well below capital expenses for developing the ﬁelds. It may sell its per period
production to various consumption regions, with prices P, using pipeline capacity available at
costs w. By depleting the developed ﬁelds, however, total production capacity I declines, by the
term D which depends on depletion x. After some periods’ production, ﬁelds get depleted and
investments in new ﬁelds may be made to bring capacity I up again to its previous levels.
The value,V, consists of revenues minus costs in each period, discounted at discount factor
δ. We set the discount rate equal to 5% in our base case calculations. Revenues equal price Pj
times quantity, for each market, season and period. Costs incorporate transport costs to bring
production from the production country i to market j (given by the auction price wij clearing the
transport market), and production costs. Integral long-run production costs vary from around 1
cent per cubic metre for the large Groningen ﬁeld in the Netherlands, to 4-9 cents for off-shore
ﬁelds in the Dutch, English and Norwegian North Sea, and over 10 cents for Russian production.
Production costs consist of variable operating costs, c(x), and investment costs. The latter
increase with depletion of the region’s resources, as increasingly more difﬁcult ﬁelds will need
to be developed. We model this increase of investment costs as an exponential function of the
region’s depletion rate, where costs rise by a factor e2 ' 7.4 as total remaining resources decline
from their initial value R (the smallest ﬁelds remaining will usually be highly costly to produce).
Furthermore, investment costs will rise over time since costs of new exploration activities need
to be included as proven resources R0 are depleted, and currently undiscovered resources have to
be converted into proven reserves. We account for exploration by including an additional
exploration cost when production exceeds proven reserves. Total per unit investment costs K per











The latter term captures the jump to inclusion of exploration costs Ei, but smoothes this out, with
smoothing parameter α8. We will ﬁnally allow for technological progress by annually reducing
investment costs K0
i and Ei by a small percentage.
In the marginal costs c0 for the Groningen ﬁeld, we allow for a mark-up representing the loss
of option value due to production. The Groningen ﬁeld is currently highly ﬂexible, and can
8 for large α the function converges to a step function
12therefore exploit variations in short term prices. A higher volatility of spot prices would
therefore entail higher option value for the Groningen ﬁeld. This option value is not represented
in the value function (of course, the ability to beneﬁt from seasonal price variations is). The true
value function therefore includes a term representing this option value. Furthermore, this term
depends on remaining reserves in the ﬁeld, and as such would give a contribution to the
ﬁrst-order conditions determining production: additional output now would destroy part of the
ﬂexibility value at the end of Groningen’s life. In de Joode and Mulder (2004) the beneﬁt of
saving base load Groningen production in order to capture future option value from short-term
ﬂexibility was studied. The authors concluded that, depending on e.g. price volatility, the effect
was of the order of 1-3 cents per cubic metre.
Production capacity It declines with use, modelled by the depreciation factor D(I,x); the
depreciation of capacity arises by depletion of developed ﬁelds, which leads ﬁrst to declining
pressure, and hence capacity, and secondly to ﬁelds being depleted altogether. The speed of
depletion will depend on the typical sizes of reservoirs in the region. In our model, we assume
that without investment, production capacity depreciates at a percentage per year equal to its
utilisation rate (total production as a percentage of capacity) divided by a ‘characteristic time’ t∗
i ,
that is region dependent. For (typically) large ﬁelds, t∗
i will be long, while small ﬁelds may be
depleted in 5 to 10 years.
Production is subject to a set of constraints. The Greek letters in brackets are the shadow
variables associated to each constraint. Firstly, in each period total production (x) is limited by
available production capacity (I). We take into account the lead times of investments in
production capacity and other infrastructure by using a suitably lagged capacity in this
constraint. Secondly, we require that investments are zero or positive, so that installed capacity
cannot be divested (investments are sunk costs). Finally, aggregate production is limited by total
available resources (i.e. including undiscovered resources); the associated shadow price σ gives
rise to the resource rent, which viewed from a ’current value’ perspective, grows with δ−1 each
period.
In addition to these constraints, we add for selected producers constraints on the minimum or
maximum value of annual production. These might reﬂect political limits on production, or can
be interpreted as a reduced form of a Stackelberg equilibrium.
The conjectural variations assumption on production is embodied in the functional
dependence of the price Pj in market j on player i’s supplies xi,j into this market. Clearly Pj
depends on the total quantity delivered to this market, Xj = åixij. In the Cournot framework,
players assume that
∂Xj
∂xij = 1, i.e. in optimising they take their competitors’ deliveries as ﬁxed.
For more competitive assumptions,
∂Xj
∂xij < 1, with as a limiting case perfect competition, where
producers anticipate their own deviations from equilibrium quantities to be completely
13compensated, in equilibrium, by their competitors’.
Let us ﬁnally note that taxation is not included in the above formulation of producer
optimisation. Taxation has no inﬂuence on optimal behaviour if it has no effect at the margin.
For EU producers, currently taxation mainly consists of a proﬁt tax. Royalties, for instance, have
generally been abandoned for offshore production. Such proﬁt taxes would appear in the value
function as a multiplier of the entire value, and as such would not inﬂuence the equilibrium
conditions (not even if tax rates differ over producers). This is a simpliﬁcation, as tax distortions
do occur also with existing proﬁt taxes, mainly as a result of cost cash ﬂows not being tax
deductible when they are made, but only with a delay according to their depreciation schedules.
Some countries have for this region introduced accelerated depreciation schemes, or account for
distortions by so-called ﬁscal uplift allowances.
4.2 The transmission operators
We assume that transmission companies are unbundled from production companies. Therefore,
we consider a non-strategic (price-taking) transmission operator that builds and expands
transmission links between, ﬁrstly, production regions i and markets j, and secondly, between
different markets j and j0. The latter set of links is also used by traders to arbitrage away price
differences between markets. The available capacity is auctioned to market players, resulting in
prices that are required to ration demand for transmission capacity to available capacity. We will
assume that there are linear variable costs of transporting gas between two regions, with constant
marginal costs tcij. We will furthermore assume no netting, i.e. transport ﬂows that run counter
to the main direction of ﬂow (so-called backhaul) are not assumed to free up more capacity for
the main ﬂow direction.





δt ((wij −tcij)yij −KT(Tijt −depr·Tij,t−1)), (4.3)
over total ﬂow yijts across each link in each period, and total transport capacity Tijt for each link.
Again, this is subject to some constraints:
y,T ≥ 0
y ≤ Tt−1 (θ)
Tt −depr·Tt−1 ≥ 0 (τ)
Similar conditions hold for the intermarket (j j0) capacities and ﬂows. As already noted above,
wij denotes the scarcity price of transmission capacity, which is considered exogenous by the
14transmission operator, and which is determined by the market clearing conditions for
transmission capacity, as described below. KT are the per unit investment costs for capacity,
which we consider constant for a given link. The costs do depend on the distance between the
two connected nodes (and are larger for subsea links). The factor depr represents a potential
depreciation factor. Although pipeline capacity only deteriorates slowly, this factor may
represent the decline in other infrastructure in mature offshore areas, where for example gas
treatment platforms may be removed as production declines. The rest of the problem is similar
to the producer problem.
In the transmission network we allow for a distinction between low and high caloriﬁc gas.
The Dutch Groningen ﬁeld as well as German production is assumed to consist of low caloriﬁc
gas, while the remainder of production is high caloriﬁc. Markets for low-cal gas are localised in
(parts of) the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Systems of low- and high-cal gas are
separate, but some communication between them is allowed for. High-cal gas can be pumped
into the low-cal system when mixed with nitrogen (quality conversion), whereas some low-cal
gas can be mixed with high-cal gas while remaining within the quality speciﬁcation range of the
high-cal system. Since these ﬂows between the systems can ﬂuctuate over the seasons, this
allows some ﬂexibility to be shared among both systems. Capacity for both directions is
considered to be limited.
4.3 Storage
We assume storage, located in each consumer market j, is solely used for arbitraging gas prices
between seasons; in a two-season setting, this implies injecting gas in summer and withdrawing
in winter. In the model, storage operators are considered to be price takers9. Storage quantities





(Pj −cstor)stors −KS(storcapt −storcapt−1) (4.4)
subject to
stors ≥ −storcap (ψ −)
stors ≤ storcap (ψ +)
ås stors = 0 (ψ)
storcapt −storcapt−1 ≥ 0 φ
9 It may well be argued that, as a result of limited access to in particular depleted ﬁelds, the market for seasonal storage is
characterised by entry barriers making it less than perfectly competitive. We will incorporate this by assuming a mark-up
on storage costs.
15One might assume both variable costs cstor of injection and withdrawal, which would require
negative cstor for injection. In the model we will allocate these costs to extraction only, i.e.
cstor = 0 for negative stors. In practice the difference does not matter because storage is
typically sold, under Third Party Access (TPA), in bundles consisting of a combination of
injection, storage and extraction.
4.4 Arbitrage
While producers i decide which markets j to deliver to, price differences between different
markets cannot diverge as long as transmission capacity is available to traders trying to arbitrage




Pj0 −Pj −wj j0

aj j0, (4.5)
where aj j0 is the volume of gas bought in market j and sold in market j0. Only markets j and j0
that are directly connected are considered in the sum.
4.5 LNG imports
We incorporate the imports of LNG from a global, exogenous, LNG market by price taking
traders. Imports of LNG require the construction of LNG import terminals in each market. The
capacities of such terminals limit total imports in each season. LNG-operators thus optimise
VLNG,
VLNG
j =å(Pj −PLNG−cLNG)LNGimp−KLNG(LNGcapt −LNGcapt−1) (4.6)
subject to
LNGimp,LNGcap ≥ 0
LNGimp ≤ LNGcap (ν)
LNGcapt −LNGcapt−1 ≥ 0 (ω)
Buyers of LNG in the various markets compete with each other on a global LNG market. Supply
on this global market is limited; we model the aggregate residual supply curve for LNG to
Europe as a straight line, with a season dependent intercept and a constant slope,
pLNG = p0+ p1åLNGimp.
Furthermore, we assume a maximum available amount of LNG for Europe (that might arise
from exogenous limited LNG production capacity in exporting countries), which is in
accordance with projections from IEA.
164.6 Demand
The demand side of the market is considered to be price taking. We deﬁne for each country an
aggregate wholesale demand (increasing with time), consisting of large industrial users and
power stations that may themselves be active in this market, and supply companies acting on
behalf of smaller consumers. Consumers strive to maximise their surplus,CSj, by adjusting their
demand dj,
CSj = Sj(dj)−Pjdj. (4.7)
In the model we will consider quadratic gross surplus Sj, leading to linear demand functions,
Pj = S0
j = aj −bjdj. (4.8)
The b-parameter is representative of the inverse size of the market. a and b will be ﬁxed by
calibrating on observed price-quantity pairs, and on an assumed gas-price elasticity, −
dlogd
dlogP. We
incorporate in the model an exogenous growth of gas demand, which will affect only the
b-parameter, making it time dependent.
4.7 Market clearing
We close the model with the market clearing conditions for the markets for gas and transmission







(aj0 j −aj j0). (4.9)
Secondly demand for transmission services equals supply of transmission services,
å
(i,j00)
nixij00 +aj j0 −aj0 j = yj j0 (4.10)
where the sum is over producer deliveries that use transmission link (j j0)10. The clearing
conditions determine prices Pj and wij,wj j0.
4.8 Solving the model
The mathematical model consists of the ﬁrst order conditions for all the above players’ value
functions. Because of the constraints, these conditions take the form of a (mixed)
10 We allocate the various ﬂows from producers to markets to the transmission links along the shortest route, i.e. we
ignore the possibility of producers selling gas via a detour.
17complementarity problem. In their individual optimalisations, players take into account all data
of other players. Each agent takes as ﬁxed the decisions of other players at the solutions to their
individual optimisation (except for the producers who employ conjectured variations on their
rivals). The same holds for the market clearing prices, except again for producers who take into





Since only a few countries or regions account for most of gas production and consumption in
Europe, we aggregate total supply and demand into these main markets. The supply regions that
we explicitly model are given in table 5.1, together with current estimates of their remaining
resources. As mentioned, the total reserves in each production area can be distinguished in
known reserves, and an estimate of reserves that have either not yet been found, or are located in
as yet uneconomic areas11. We take data on these categories of reserves from reports published
by national governments for the UK, Norway and the Netherlands, and from OGP (2003).
Table 5.1 Reservesa
Proven reserves in bcmb Discovered and undiscovered potential Total
Norway and Denmark 2467 2852 5319
United Kingdom 905 645 1550
The Netherlands, Groningen 1068 0 1068
The Netherlands, small ﬁelds 381 366 747
Germany and Austria 367 420 787
Italy 182 215 397
Eastern Europe 358 614 972
Algeria 4500 1136 5636
Russia 32960 44736 77696
a Source: National governments and OGP (2003)
b billion cubic metres
11 This might include for example gas that requires new production technology to be efﬁciently developed.
185.1.2 Production capacity and costs
For each country, current available production capacity is derived from monthly maximum
production quantities, estimated from IEA (2005a). The magnitude of production capacity will
change as time progresses and resources are extracted (lowering capacity), or new ﬁelds are
developed (raising capacity).
Per region we assume all producers to face the same average costs, except for the
Netherlands where we distinguish between the low cost Groningen ﬁeld and the higher cost
small ﬁelds. Production costs consist of initial investment costs, proportional to the capacity that
is installed, and operational costs that we assume to be proportional to the amount of gas
produced. As a starting point for operational costs (including loss of gas), we estimate that these
amount, on average, to 10% of the total investment costs1213
These two cost components can be converted into an average cost ﬁgure, using the expected
life of individual ﬁelds. The latter is governed by a ’characteristic time’, t∗: in t years, a region’s
production existing capacity will decline by a factor t/t∗, leading to exponential depreciation of
production capacity.
The discount factor applied in the model is the same for all investments. It is set at a rate of
5% in real terms, consistent with Mulder and Zwart (2006a).
We calibrate initial investment and operational costs such that the average costs computed
from them correspond with average cost estimates for the various regions from TNO and IEA,
see table 5.2. We furthermore assume that as resources in a region are depleted, investment costs
increase, as progressively more challenging or smaller ﬁelds are taken into production. This is
partly offset by technological progress, which we set at a 1% decline in investment costs per year
in our base case.
When reserves are exhausted, capacity expansion involves additional exploration activity,
leading to extra costs. Based on information from producers, we estimate exploration costs E at
0.02 euro/m3 (annualised).
5.1.3 Degree of competition
Finally we have to make assumptions on the level of competition in the various production
markets. This is ﬁrstly represented by the number of ﬁrms active in the market. Most production
countries are currently dominated by one large (state) monopolist. In the base case, we assume,
12 From cost data on UK off-shore production, there appears to be large variation in this cost share. The model results
turn out to be mainly sensitive to aggregate average costs, and not so much to the precise split between short- and
long-term costs.
13 For Russian supplies, we assume a lower share of variable costs, as the average costs in the table mainly consist of
costs for transport to the Russian border.
19Table 5.2 Production capacities in modelled producing regionsc, as well as estimated average cost range of
production d
Production capacity in bcm/y average costs in euro/m3 characteristic time t∗
Norway and Denmark 83 0.05-0.08 15
United Kingdom 110 0.05-0.09 10
The Netherlands Groningen 76 0.005-0.01 15
The Netherlands small ﬁelds 44 0.04-0.06 10
Germany and Austria 29 0.05-0.08 10
Italy 14 0.03-0.05 10
Eastern Europe 28 0.05-0.08 10
Algeria 85 0.02-0.03 15
Russia 140e 0.10-0.15f 15
a Source: IEA (2005a), based on maximum monthly production for OECD countries, NationalGrid website for UK, EZ (2005) for the
Netherlands
b based on data provided by TNO-NITG
c Source: IEA (2005a), based on maximum monthly production for OECD countries, NationalGrid website for UK, EZ (2005) for the
Netherlands
d based on data provided by TNO-NITG
e production for Europe
f costs including transport to Russian border
therefore, that the number of producers per region (or better, the inverse of the
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index14) equals one, except for the UK where many players compete (6 in
the model), the Dutch small ﬁelds, and Norway, where monopolist GFU was recently split up,
leading to a market dominated by two companies, Norsk Hydro and Statoil.
The second determinant of competition is the conjectural variations parameter (which may
differ between ﬁrms). In our baseline scenario, we put this value at 0.25, but as it has large
implications on model results, we will explore its variation in various scenarios.
Finally, we allow for constraints on annual production for political or technical reasons. In
the base case we constrain production in the smaller European regions to current ﬁgures.
Furthermore, we assume a minimum bound on Russian production to Europe of 140 bcm in the
baseline scenario, to incorporate its potential Stackelberg leadership. For Algeria, which has
very low costs of supply, we implement a cap on production of 100 bcm, since part of its
production may be expected not to be directed to Europe, as the country strives for
diversiﬁcation of its supplies.
14 The Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, or HHI, is a measure of competition in the market. It is obtained by summing squares
of the production shares, and, in symmetric markets, equals the inverse of the number of market players.
205.2 Demand
We aggregate total demand into a limited number of consumption regions, as listed in table 5.3.
We take initial demand in each market from IEA (2005a). We assume demand to be price
responsive, and governed by a linear price-demand relationship.
Estimates of elasticity of gas demand vary widely. Short-run elasticities are typically quite
small, ranging approximately between 0 and -0.5. Estimates for longer-term elasticities (of
relevance for our long-term model) where found in Stam (2003) to range from 0.18 to 0.65. In
our baseline scenario we use an elasticity of 0.25.









UK and Ireland 105
a Source: IEA (2005a)
Annual demand is distributed over winter and summer in a 65 to 35 ratio. This corresponds
to current Dutch ratios, and is higher than currently in other regions. Swing ratios may increase
elsewhere as gas penetration in the household segment increase. If gas use for base-load
electricity production increases, it is likely that this ratio will decrease. We furthermore make a
distinction between high and low-cal gas, where we estimate the latter market at 90 bcm/y,
distributed over the Netherlands, Begium and Germany.
5.3 Transport capacity
The representation of the transmission grid connecting the production regions and regional
markets is depicted in ﬁgure 5.1.
Current transport capacities on the main routes connecting the model’s regions are
summarised in table 5.4. For capacity additions to long-range transmission pipelines, we
calculate investment costs of 0.2 euro/m3/1000 km, based on data provided by TNO-NITG.
Further, we assume variable costs of transport, tc, for e.g. compression and losses, to equal
0.005 euro/m3/1000 km.













We assume that in particular the offshore transmission systems for the Netherlands and the
UK, two mature areas, will experience relatively fast depreciation. According to industry, Dutch
offshore infrastructure will not be in use anymore after around 20 years as a result of too high
investment and operational costs. In the model we assume exponential depreciation of off-shore
infrastructure equal to 3% per year. This was calibrated to provide production rates consistent
with current forecasts of small ﬁelds production over the next 20 years.
Table 5.4 Initial transport capacities (in bcm per year) a
Alg Bel E.Eur Fra Ger Ita NL Nor Rus Spa UK
Algeria - - - - - 25 - - - 10 -
Belgium - - - 28 10 - 11 12 - - 20
Eastern Europe - - - - 115 2 - - 168 - -
France - 28 - - 13 - - 14 - 2 -
Germany - 10 115 13 - 32 51 52 - - -
Italy 25 - 2 - 32 - - - - - -
Netherlands - 11 - - 51 - - - - - -
Norway - 12 - 14 52 - - - - - 11
Russia - - 168 - - - - - - - -
Spain 10 - - 2 - - - - - - -
UK - 20 - - - - - 11 - - -
a based on Perner (2002)
5.4 Storage
Storage for seasonal ﬂexibility occurs mainly in depleted gas ﬁelds or aquifers; higher cost
storage in salt caverns or LNG installations is used for short-term ﬂexibility. As our model
22focuses on medium- and long-term developments, we concentrate here on the former type.
Capacity costs for storage decline with volume; countries with large depleted gas reservoirs have
a cost advantage in building such capacity. Moreover, onshore capacity has lower costs than
offshore. In table 5.5 we describe current available seasonal storage capacity, and give a rough
estimate on investment costs based on existing facilities (based cost estimates in Clingendael
International Energy Programme (2005) and ILEX (2005), and natural availability of various
storage options in various countries). We assume variable operating costs of storage being in the
order of 2% of capital expenditures (based on TNO-NITG data), but wil incorporate higher
values of 3 cents per m3 as a representation of potential mark ups due to monopoly power in the
storage market.
Table 5.5 Storage capacities (working volumes, in bcm) of storage in European marketsa
Working volumes in bcm investment costs in euro/m3 working volume
Netherlands 4.5 0.8
Belgium 0.5 1.5
UK and Ireland 2.8 0.9




Eastern Europe 11.6 0.8
a Source: IEA (2005a)
5.5 LNG capacity
Terminal costs are generally site-speciﬁc. We start from a base line capacity cost assumption of
30 million Eur/bcm/yr (based on cost data from EIA (2003)). Depending on proximity to
consumption regions, we add a markup for transportation costs, consistent with pipeline capacity
costs of 20 million Eur/bcm per 100 km. This basically results in costs for LNG terminal
capacity being slightly lower in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and Italy, and higher in
Eastern Europe.
LNG prices are determined on a global market, and prices above which LNG will be
attracted to the European market will therefore reﬂect market movements in prices of oil and gas
in other global regions. It is mainly through these prices that long-term gas prices will remain
linked to global oil prices. Apart from this, total LNG supplies available will be limited in the
short term, as global liquefaction and shipping capacity has to be expanded. In line with IEA
forecasts, we assume an annual growth of available supplies (for the European market) of around
2310 bcm/yr, starting from an initial 50 bcm/yr. For LNG prices we assume a spread between
seasons, and an elasticity of supply reﬂecting larger costs for more remote production. Based on
forecasts of future gas prices, and currently observable seasonal spreads in prices (e.g. in the US
futures market), we assume costs of 0.13 and 0.17 euro/m3 in summer and winter respectively in
the baseline scenario, and a cost difference of 0.02 (based on OME (2004) supply curve data)
between the closest and most distant sources used (i.e. the cost slope declines as supply capacity
grows). We will explore sensitivity to these assumptions.







a Source: IEA (2005a)
6 Model results
Now we turn to the model’s output. The input data for the model that we have discussed above
constitute the base case parameters. We now run the model for the base case parameter
assumptions, and discuss the base case model projections.
We run the model using time periods of 5 years, extending over 10 periods. We will consider
results up to 30 years in the future (i.e. the ﬁrst 6 model periods, each comprising a winter and a
summer period). The remaining, ﬁnal periods’ model results will be increasingly affected by the
end of the modelling horizon after 50 years. In the model, players will not invest in these last
periods, as the majority of the revenues from those investments will occur after the artiﬁcial
modelling horizon, and will therefore not be taken into account in the optimisation. In contrast,
the ﬁrst 30 years’ results can be veriﬁed to be insensitive to the precise choice of horizon.
We evaluate the model’s predictions for the ﬁrst ﬁve-year period, as well as the developments
into the future. Where applicable we compare to actual observable data. It is important to keep
in mind that the data in the model were calibrated on actual current ﬁgures. The various
capacities (such as production, transport, storage) correspond to actual values, and demand was
calibrated to match observed 2003 demand levels. A large part of the ﬁrst period’s output is
heavily inﬂuenced by these data (for instance because some producers produce at maximum
capacity). On the other hand, some of the model’s ﬁrst-period results differ substantialy from
24actually observed values. This is not particularly worrying as it should be recognised that current
institutional arrangements differ signiﬁcantly on some points from the liberalised structure
assumed in the model. Nevertheless, it is useful to do this comparison to analyse which factors
might explain potential discrepancies.
6.1 Production
We ﬁrst focus on aggregate annual production for Europe. Table 6.1 lists the model results for
the ﬁrst period, and compares this to actual production (2003 values, non-EU imports based on
Energy Markets Consultants (2005a)).
Table 6.1 Supply to Europe (2003)
production region model actual
Norway and Denmark 81 79
United Kingdom 103 109
The Netherlands Groningen 41 34
The Netherlands small ﬁelds 40 39
Germany and Austria 20 24
Italy 14 15
Eastern Europe 26 23
Algeria (by pipe) 35 34
Russia 140 141
LNG imports 22 32
Total 521 530
Output is fairly well in line with actual results. In fact supplies of many countries are at or
near the maximum allowed by initial production capacity or transport capacity.
Turning to the development of supply quantities in future periods, ﬁgure 6.1, we ﬁnd that the
largest changes at ﬁrst occur in supplies from Algeria, where a lot of transport capacity is added
to relieve constraints that were binding in the ﬁrst period. (We assume investment lead times of 5
years here). Other more modest increases come from Norway and Russia. Further in time, we
see that while production in the Dutch small ﬁelds and the UK declines rapidly, additional
increases in supply come from Russia, Algeria, Norway, and, in particular after 15 years, from a
fast growth in LNG imports.
6.2 Prices
In the base case, prices gradually increase over time. We show in table 6.2 initial period and ﬁnal
period prices for the base case. While initially prices between regions diverge as a consequence
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of limited transport capacity, in the ﬁnal model period prices more or less equilibrate over
Europe. Winter-summer price differences are around 4 cents, driven partly by the assumed LNG
price structure. Price levels reﬂect long-run averages, as short-run ﬂuctuations in supply and
demand are not incorporated in the model.
6.3 Transport
Next we focus on transport ﬂows between countries. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give resulting annual
cross-border ﬂows for the ﬁrst period (years 0-5) and the ﬁnal period (years 25-30), respectively.
Table 6.5 furthermore presents the development of ﬂows for some key cross-border connections.
Transport capacity increases gradually to accommodate the growing production over time.
The largest expansion occurs between Algeria and Italy: rapid growth to 71 bcm/y over the ﬁrst
5-year period, and continued growth from there. Also the link between Algeria and Spain
expands, though to a slightly smaller extent. Here growth takes place to 28 bcm/y in the 5-10
year window. Other signiﬁcant expansion occurs between Norway and Germany, and Norway
and the UK. Also a connection between the Netherlands and the UK is predicted in this base
scenario, with ﬂows gradually growing to 28 bcm/y.
26Table 6.2 Prices
years 0-5 years 25-30
winter summer winter summer
Ger 14 11 17 13
IT 17 14 17 13
Fran 17 13 17 13
NL 14 11 17 13
B 17 11 17 13
Sp 19 13 17 13
EastEurCons 14 11 16 13
UKCons 18 10 17 13
NLLow 13 10 19 14
BLow 22 10 19 14
GerLow 14 10 18 14
Table 6.3 Transport ﬂows in initial period
Rus Nor Alg Ger Ita Fra NL Bel Spa E.Eur UK
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -140 0
Norway 0 0 0 -52 0 -14 0 -4 0 0 -11
Algeria 0 0 0 0 -25 0 0 0 -10 0 0
Germany 0 52 0 0 -32 -13 19 -7 0 80 0
Italy 0 0 25 32 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
France 0 14 0 13 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 -19 0 0 0 -9 0 0 0
Belgium 0 4 0 7 0 0 9 0 0 0 8
Spain 0 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe 140 0 0 -80 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 -8 0 0 0
6.4 LNG capacity
As can be seen from ﬁgure 6.1, LNG imports will play a more important role in future supplies
to Europe. While current LNG terminal capacity is located mainly in Spain and France, growth
is forecasted to occur mainly in Italy, and later in the UK, as demonstrated in table 6.6.
6.5 Flexibility
The model also includes seasonality in demand, so we can investigate the future sources of
ﬂexibility. The main ones are presented in table 6.7. The quantities represent the difference of
winter and summer supplies for each source.
In the initial period, total European seasonal swing is 135 bcm/y, growing to 191 bcm/y in
27Table 6.4 Transport ﬂows in ﬁnal period
Rus Nor Alg Ger Ita Fra NL Bel Spa E.Eur UK
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -337 0
Norway 0 0 0 -80 0 -14 0 -3 0 0 -39
Algeria 0 0 0 0 -72 0 0 0 -28 0 0
Germany 0 80 0 0 7 -44 -115 -4 0 213 0
Italy 0 0 72 -7 0 0 0 0 0 34 0
France 0 14 0 44 0 0 0 -10 2 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 115 0 0 0 -14 0 0 -59
Belgium 0 3 0 4 0 10 14 0 0 0 -9
Spain 0 0 28 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe 337 0 0 -213 -34 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK 0 39 0 0 0 0 59 9 0 0 0
Table 6.5 Annual transport ﬂows (bcm) for selected pipelines
years 0-5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years 15-20 years 20-25 years 25-30
Algeria-Italy 25 72 72 72 72 72
Algeria-Spain 10 28 28 28 28 28
Norway-UK 11 28 39 39 39 39
Norway-Germany 52 70 80 80 80 80
Nehterlands-UK 0 9 28 46 53 59
the ﬁnal period. We ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst period, supply of swing relies mainly on storage. Also
Groningen is an important supplies of swing in Europe. After the expansion of import capacity
from Algeria, a relatively competitive source of ags for (Southern) Europe, this country supplies
swing. Total storage contributes 95 bcm (47.5 bcm injection in summer, 47.5 bcm withdrawal in
winter). Other important sources are Groningen and later Algeria. LNG starts contributing only
in later periods, when it takes a more prominent role in supplies to Europe. Although swing in
Russian supplies is relatively very small, due to the large total supplies from it does take an
important role.
7 Assessment of the model
7.1 Introduction
Ideally, a model’s results should be validated by assessing how well it performs on historic data.
For our model this is problematic as major assumptions underpinning the model, i.e. a
competitive European gas market, were not valid in the past. We developed the model to assess
the effects of liberalisation of the European gas market. The presence of sufﬁciently liquid
wholesale markets for gas, on which competitors can enter, and the independence of
28Table 6.6 LNG terminal capacities (bcm/y), installed capacity at end of period
years 0-5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years 15-20 years 20-25 years 25-30
Germany 0 0 0 0 4 4
Italy 4 4 4 11 16 23
France 15 15 15 15 15 19
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 7 22
Belgium 5 5 5 5 5 5
Spain 16 16 16 16 16 16
Eastern Europe 2 2 2 2 2 9
UK 0 0 24 46 68 92
Table 6.7 Major sources of seasonal swing (winter minus summer supplies)
years 0-5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years 15-20 years 20-25 years 25-30
Algeria 0 28 29 29 29 29
Russia 0 18 0 3 13 24
Groningen 18 23 23 19 18 18
UK 7 6 0 0 0 0
LNG 2 0 0 10 8 8
storage 95 30 77 91 100 107
infrastructure owners from production incumbents, are key components of the model. This
contrasts with the pre-liberalisation era, where gas supply, transport and storage was an
essentially monopolistic integrated business on national markets, and a competitive European
gas market did not exist. Even today the ideal underlying the model is still far from reached.
Rather, we try to get a sense of what the future effects will be of the competitive gas markets that
are envisaged today.
Therefore, we have to rely on other methods of assessment. Firstly, we evaluate the
plausibility of the output of the model. This also includes an evaluation of the robustness of the
model’s results to changes in input parameters. In particular, we study the impact of changing
those parameters that th model is most sensitive to. We focus on the competitivity of production
(the conjectural variations parameter) and on the exogenous LNG prices and see how changing
these affects the model’s output. Secondly, we deﬁne four possible scenarios involving different
combinations of these parameters, and assess the plausibility of the future gas scenarios
simulated with the model, by comparing these results with current developments and forecasts
presented by other institutions.
297.2 Model sensitivities
One test of the validity of the model is to assess its robustness against changes in the parameters
of the model. We conducted a sensitivity analysis by running the model with adjustments
subsequently made to each parameter of the model, and comparing how key model results
change as a consequence of those changes. Changes in assumed demand growth obviously
change future production levels. Variations in cost parameters mainly affect Russian production
and LNG imports: these two supplies are both on the margin, and reductions in production costs
or pipeline costs shift volume from LNG to Russian pipeline gas, while decreases in LNG prices
or costs shifts the balance towards LNG. Also market prices are affect most by changes in LNG
prices and Russian gas. Changes in competitivity (either changes in demand elasticity or in
producer competition) also give non-negiligible effects.
Since in particular future competitivity and future LNG prices, as input data, are hard to
predict, we now focus on the impact of varying assumptions on the competitivity parameter, and
on the exogenous price level above which import of LNG becomes viable. The competitivity
parameter may in principle range from the perfect competition level 0, to the Cournot level 1. A
priori, we cannot determine which level will be representative of the level of competition in the
future European gas market, but we may get intuition for realistic values by studying the changes
in gas prices and sources induced by varying the parameter.
We compare the benchmark case of full competition, where prices will reﬂect (long-run)
marginal costs of production and transport (including opportunity costs), with non-fully
competitive scenarios, characterised by conjectural variation parameters equal to 0.2, 0.3 and
0.4, and the most extreme case of pure Cournot competition (parameter equal to 1). In ﬁgures
7.1 and 7.2, we illustrate the effect on Dutch prices, LNG imports, and imports from Norway
and Russia.
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We see that perfect competition gives rise to signiﬁcantly lower prices than the other
parameter values. The threshold price for importing LNG is only reached towards the end of the
model period (and initially in some countries as a consequence of transmission constraints), and
total imports of LNG remain low. Imports come mainly from Russia in later periods, and in fact
Russian exports may well exceed what many observers consider Russian production capable of
in practice. Norwegian production appears less sensitive to the level of competition.
Since in these computations, prices for LNG have been left unchanged, under no variant do
prices range high above the 0.17 euro/m3 winter threshold price, but we see that as competion
decreases, this requires increasingly high supplies of LNG. In fact one of the main consequences
of changing competition levels in the last periods is a shift between Russian imports and LNG
(as other sources are then nearing depletion or are constrained (Algeria). Under Cournot
assumptions, Russian imports never exceed their lower bound of 140 bcm per year.
Prices above which LNG inputs become competitive are therefore also a crucial input in the
model, and we consider variants of the baseline scenario (with competition factor 0.25) with
varying LNG price levels. The values we choose are ‘low’ (0.13 euro/m3), ‘base’ (0.15
euro/m3), ‘high’ (0.18 euro/m3). Winter and summer threshold prices are two cents above and
below these average price levels. In ﬁgures 7.3 and 7.4 we again compare the same outputs as
above for these variants.
We see that for the high variant, LNG hardly plays a role, with the other assumptions
unaltered. For LNG available at lower price levels, both Russian and Norwegian imports are
partly displaced by LNG.
7.3 Scenarios
We found that the model is relatively robust to small changes of most individual parameters. On
the other hand, some of the parameters that the model is more sensitive to are inherently difﬁcult
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to calibrate, in particular future levels of competition, both between traditional suppliers and
involving LNG supplies. We studied effects of variations of these parameters on model
outcomes. We now proceed to study the effects of changing multiple parameters at the same
time by constructing four alternative plausible scenarios.
The scenarios were introduced in Mulder and Zwart (2006a). We list the characteristics of
these scenarios in table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Characteristics of scenarios
Parameter Baseline Competition Seller’s market High prices
competition parameter 0.25 0.15 0.45 0.25 and 1 a
demand growth 1.5% 1% 1.5% 2 %
LNG prices 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.28
a Competition factor is 1 for non-EU suppliers. In addition, in this scenario the Russian minimum exports to Europe are reduced to 120
bcm/y
We again look at the same output factors as considered in the above variants in ﬁgures 7.5
32and 7.6.
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baseline competition sellers' market high prices
We see a large range of prices related to the scenarios. LNG imports play an important role
in particular in the more competitive scenarios. Prices in Europe are too low to attract LNG at
the higher LNG price levels, even at reduced levels of (pipeline) competition. The shortfall of
LNG in these latter scenarios is made up by additional supplies by Norway and Russia.
337.4 Comparison to current developments and other models
We can also check the plausibility of the model results by comparing with actual developments
in the industry, as well as longer-term forecasts by various other institutions.
7.4.1 Current developments
Given the fairly long lead times in construction of large scale gas infrastructure, currently
planned projects give information on major developments in the gas market for at least the ﬁrst 5
years. We list here some of the current major developments in pipeline and LNG construction
(drawing from Clingendael International Energy Programme (2004), Seeliger (2004), Stern
(2004), Energy Markets Consultants (2005b), Gas Matters (2005)).
As far as transport capacity is concerned, various planned projects are discussed in the
literature:
• Norway: Norway’s pipeline capacity to Europe is to be signiﬁcantly expanded by the
construction of the 24 bcm/year Langeled pipeline bringing gas from the newly discovered
Ormen Lange ﬁeld to the UK. This adds to the existing capacity to the UK (the Vesterled
pipeline). Apart from this new line, a second line of similar size (Symphony line) is under
discussion. Connections with continental Europe are not expected to be expanded over the
coming decade.
• North Africa: Algeria currently pipes gas to Spain (pipeline through Morocco) and to Italy (via
Tunisia). Capacity of both lines will be expanded by around 5 bcm/year. In addition, a new line
to Spain, the 8 to 16 bcm/year Medgaz line, is under construction, and a new line to Italy, the
8-10 bcm/year Galsi line is planned. Besides these lines, the Green Stream pipeline connecting
Libya to Italy is under construction. The capacity will be 11 bcm/year.
• Russia: Russia exports gas mainly through the Ukraine. Although aggregate capacity is around
135 bcm/year, a large part of this capacity remains unused. Disputes over gas payments with the
Ukraine in the 1990s led the Russians to construct an alternative route to Europe via Belarus, to
reduce dependence on the transits through the Ukraine. In spite of the large transport capacity
already present, plans are made to construct a new pipeline across the Baltic sea to Germany. A
partnership with Wintershall over this 20-30 bcm/year project was recently concluded. In
addition to Russia, also the Caspian region may deliver pipeline gas to Europe in the near future.
• Netherlands/UK: Another large project currently under construction is the BBL pipeline
between the Netherlands and the UK, with planned capacity of 16 bcm/year.
The ﬁeld of LNG import capacity attracts a lot of interest currently. The largest LNG
importers, France and Spain, are expanding existing terminals as well as considering new build.
Also in Belgium, the grid operator is considering expanding the Zeebrugge import terminal. A
34large new player in the ﬁeld is the UK, where the ﬁrst phase of the Isle of Grain facility was
recently completed. Expansion of this facility and plans for two facilities in Milford Haven may
lead to capacity of over 40 bcm/year in the coming decade. In Italy, plans were announced to
construct an offshore LNG terminal in Italy for reception of Qatar gas. A second terminal is
planned near Brindisi. In the Netherlands, various plans for construction of terminals have been
announced recently.
In the model, initially large pipeline investments take place from Norway, both to the UK and
to Germany, in all four scenarios. Capacity to the UK grows by 20 to 30 bcm/y in the ﬁrst model
decade, and is therefore in line with actual investments. Also, the connection to Germany is
further expanded to around 70 or 80 bcm/y to accommodate the large growth of Norwegian
production. In the south, the model forecasts even larger growth of capacity from North Africa
to Spain and Italy than can be seen from actual current investments, as demonstrated for the base
case in table 6.5. Again, this is shared among all scenarios, with in Sellers’ market scenario, a
slight shift from Italy to Spain. The predicted growth of transport from the Netherlands to the
UK, between 5-10 bcm/y in after 5 years, growing to 20 bcm/y in the next period (with highest
ﬂows in the Competition scenario, and lower ﬂows in the Sellers’ market and High prices
scenarios) is in line with the BBL project. In the east, on the other hand, the model results show
no capacity expansion from Russia in the ﬁrst decade, although these do come online in the
following periods. This may well be because the actual plans for expansion do not derive from
capacity shortage per se, but from a lack of diversiﬁcation in current transport routes, as
mentioned above. This is not factored into the model.
We see that the model results do show capacity expansion in the same regions as actually
observed (except for the Russian connection), although generally modelled capacities exceed
actually planned capacities, especially in the Mediterranean region.
Looking further at LNG capacity, we see that the modelled growth of LNG is reﬂected in
large activity in LNG terminal capacity in particular in the Competition scenario, where LNG
growth is most signiﬁcant. Here we observe a large growth in the UK (5 bcm/y initially, but then
increasing to a capacity of around 40 bcm/y after a decade) coincides with actual investments.
Also investments in Italy, and to a smaller extent in France are modelled, but these occur later in
time, after some 15 years. In the other scenarios, LNG growth takes off later.
7.4.2 Comparison to IEA projections
The International Energy Agency publishes forecasts on the gas sector in its World Energy
Outlook. We compare IEA’s forecasts for Europe for the year 2030 from the WEO IEA (2005b)
to the model results in table 7.2.
While we see close agreement in projections for imports from Norway, projections for
35Table 7.2 IEA forecasts
IEA 2030 model period 5
EU production 147 100 - 115
Norwegian imports 135 133 - 145
Russian imports 155 200 - 300
African imports 184a 100
LNG imports 250 0 - 75
price level 0.13 0.13-0.23
a including LNG from Nigeria and North Africa
Russia and LNG differ widely over all scenarios. As we saw, these quantities were quite
sensitive to assumptions in LNG prices and competitivity, with an exchange taking place
between the two as assumptions changed. Apparently, to reproduce the IEA projections we
would have to change the balance between the two, by lowering LNG prices relative to Russian
prices, as discussed in the variants above. Although both projections foresee gradual decline of
European production, in our model the decline is projected to be steeper than in the IEA’s
forecasts. IEA’s general expectation of price levels in Europe coincides with our model’s in the
Baseline and Competition scenarios.
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